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The question of why we choose to watch certain films can be one of 
the most rewarding paths to social criticism.  It is a question that becomes 
particularly interesting when it is applied to the apocalyptic film culture, 
which has retained a popular appeal throughout the last decade and more.  
Apocalyptic films invariably depict massive-scale destruction and the end of 
life as we know it.  Are they popular because the experience is cathartic, 
because it is escapist in a particular cultural frame, or because our obsession 
with the end of things has been spoken across the ages as something inbuilt 
in the human species?  There is no easy way to answer such a question, but 
to examine the way in which these films have changed in accordance with 
recent history can perhaps allow an inside glimpse into their power and 
enduring appeal.   
My personal interest in apocalyptic film originated some time ago 
when I came upon Fredric Jameson’s statement, “It is easier to imagine the 
end of the world than the end of capitalism.”i  However bleak this idea is, 
recent history has demonstrated that even major shifts in global power 
relations, such as those witnessed on 9/11 and in the aftermath of the still 
ongoing global financial crisis, can do little to disturb the embedded social 
principles of capitalism.  I wish to take Jameson’s statement a little further 
and talk about the price we pay for this inability to imagine a future without 
capitalism, and suggest that it has further implications with regards to the 
virtual disappearance of utopianism in contemporary culture.  Of course, 
there is a slight contradiction in this statement:  clearly, to imagine the end 
of the world is, at the same time, also to imagine the end of capitalism.  
Given that apocalypse and utopia are two quite radically different (although 
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admittedly not mutually exclusive) ways of looking beyond capitalism, it is 
fascinating to consider that one is popular today, while the other is not.  
And so there are two things to consider here, quite beyond our inability to 
get loose from what has become the capitalist imperative:  not just the cost 
of the absence of utopia, but also the cost of our obsession with apocalypse. 
The continued popularity of apocalyptic films is surely a testament to 
our cultural preoccupation with the end of the world, but why is it that an 
event such as 9/11--an event that certainly threatened global change--has 
seemingly offered a reinforcement of the self-same structure that provoked 
the strikes on the Twin Towers in the first place?  Why is it that, when 
change threatened, many chose to stop believing in it altogether?  Barack 
Obama’s successful 2008 presidential campaign was fought on the back of 
the slogan, “Change we can believe in,” a slogan that highlights widespread 
cynicism in not just the ability of politics to make a meaningful contribution 
to global change but also the possibility of change at all.  Indeed, it is 
somewhat ironic that 9/11 has been so frequently pronounced as the 
moment when “everything changed,” since most people who were not 
directly involved got up, brushed themselves off, and went back to work.  
On the day of the attacks, President George W. Bush immediately signaled 
to the American public that it would be business as usual:  “Our financial 
institutions remain strong and the American economy will be open for 
business as well.”ii  The attacks were couched not as attacks on U.S. 
ideology, on capitalism, or on globalization but as attacks on “freedom.”  
This was the beginning of a careful and systematic attempt to reinforce the 
status quo that had been threatened by 9/11, an agenda supported not only 
by government policy and rhetoric but, in large part, by culture and the 
media, too. 
For those scholars who have begun what will inevitably be a long 
process of analysis, evaluation, and re-evaluation of the cultural response to 
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9/11, claims that the attacks “changed everything” are to be found at almost 
every turn.iii  But this claim begs a more serious analysis.  Just how did 9/11 
change everything?  While I do not wish to dispute that there has been a 
sweeping historical, political, and cultural impact, such a globalizing 
statement is intentionally confrontational.  Surely the two planes striking the 
twin towers that day did not change everything, they merely fostered the 
perception that everything had changed.   
It is true, however, that 9/11 did demand a new way of thinking and 
talking, not least because it seemed to trivialize the voices of scholars who 
had declared experience and culture bankrupt at the end of the twentieth 
century.  This time, experience had come back to bite us, and it was a 
collision between the image and reality which became the focus.  As Jean 
Baudrillard argued, “The terrorist act in New York has resuscitated both 
images and events.”iv  Yet, with this statement in mind, it seems odd that the 
actual make-up of the apocalyptic image has featured so little in the 
theoretical literature surrounding the event.v  While much of the published 
criticism to date seems to be primarily concerned with what films are being 
made, the important question of, how films are being made remains 
relatively untouched.  This is where rather than being merely descriptive 
about the landscape of post-9/11 film an emphasis should be placed on the 
aesthetic and narrative consistencies evident in post-9/11 film and culture.vi   
Apocalypse as Genre 
 Contemporary genre theory, chiefly associated with such critics as 
Steve Neale and Rick Altman, establishes that the popularity of various 
genres is cyclical, and therefore periods of generic proliferation repeat 
themselves.  These cycles can frequently be traced to periodic societal 
concerns.  The term “cycle” is an attempt to take genre studies, which has 
traditionally adopted a synchronic view of film history, and make it 
diachronic.  But beyond this, it is a way of examining the evolution of 
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genres and sub-genres which helps to account for the problems of 
maintaining novelty and creation in the film industry.  As Altman states, 
“New cycles are usually produced by associating a new type of material or 
approach with already existing genres.”vii  What we tend to see when we 
discover new themes, materials, locales, and aesthetics in what would 
otherwise fit an older mode within a pre-existing genre, is not a new genre 
but a new cycle. 
While it could be argued that the current wave of disaster/apocalyptic 
films is a continuation, and decline, of an earlier cycle, which began in the 
late 1990s, there are reasons why this current wave should be considered a 
cycle in its own right.  First, films that appeared in the latter half of the 
2000s exhibit significant stylistic differences from those in the late 1990s.  
Secondly, the two film cycles appear to respond to different historical 
events.  Films from the late 1990s have distinct millennial concerns, whereas 
those in the late 2000s respond to a cultural pessimism imbued by the 
events of 9/11.  The 1990s wave of Hollywood disaster movies itself 
represents a recycling of the invasion movies of the 1950s—Radar Men 
from the Moon (1952); Invaders from Mars (1953); Target Earth (1954)--
and the disaster movies of the 1970s—The Andromeda Strain (1971); The 
Poseidon Adventure (1972); The Towering Inferno (1974).  In his book 
Disaster Movies: the Cinema of Catastrophe, Stephen Keane identifies the 
following reasons for the 1990s re-emergence of disaster movies: 
1—The public’s fascination with the impending millennium. 
2—The absence of any concrete set of villains (after the end of 
the Cold War). 
3—The advancements in special effects technologies allowing 
for a cinematic experience in which literally anything 
imaginable could be realized onscreen. 
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4—The ease with which these films could be watched as 
largely escapist entertainment. 
5—The fact that they were making money. viii 
Interestingly, not even one of these reasons is particularly applicable to the 
current spate of post-9/11 apocalyptic films.   
Although millennial fears have been replaced by fears about climate 
change and ecological disaster, as well as the pervasive threat of terrorism, 
there is now a tangible villain figure (that of the terrorist himself).  While 
there have been advancements in technology, and these have been evident 
in contemporary apocalyptic cinema, there is little that can be achieved 
onscreen now that could not have been visualized in the late 1990s.  
Furthermore, films today are often not easy to watch and not family films.  
Instead, the majority tend to be violent and gritty films about the inevitable 
destruction of our way of life.  Finally, and perhaps most tellingly, they are 
not even making that much money compared to the 1990s films:  although 
it is true that most of the films made after 9/11 saw reasonable returns, the 
recently acclaimed adaptation of Cormac McCarthy’s novel The Road (2009) 
grossed less than thirty million dollars at the box office, world-wide. 
A brief examination of box-office receipts shows that in general post-
9/11 apocalyptic films have been less successful than their late 1990s 
counterparts.  Throughout the last decade there have been some significant 
successes:  I Am Legend (2007) grossed $256 million (sixth highest grosser 
of that year), War of the Worlds (2005) $234 million (fourth highest of the 
year), and The Day After Tomorrow (2004) $186 million (seventh highest of 
the year).ix  But for every success there was also a flop:  Legion (2010, with 
Paul Bettany and Dennis Quaid) grossed a paltry $40 million (ranked 
seventh-seventh for the year); The Core (2003, with Aaron Eckhart and 
Hilary Swank), $31 million, (ranked ninetieth); 28 Weeks Later (2007, a 
sequel to the 28 Days Later [2002]), $28 million (ranked eighty-seventh).  
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Sunshine (2007, with Cillian Murphy as an astronaut sent off to reignite the 
failing sun) failed to make the top 100 in the same year.x  Comparatively, 
1998 had three apocalypse films in the box-office top ten: Armageddon in 
second rank, with a $36-million opening weekend and more than $350 
million worldwide so far; Deep Impact in eighth rank, opening with $41 
million and running to a similar global figure now; and Godzilla right behind 
it, opening with $44 million and accumulating almost $380 million to date.  
In 1997, Dante’s Peak, The Fifth Element, and Volcano made respectable 
opening-week returns of $50 million between them and have, as a trio, 
grossed some $565 million so far.  In 1996, Independence Day topped the 
box-office chart with a gross in excess of $300 million.  Add in the fact that 
these figures are not inflation-adjusted for the earliest years and the margins 
appear even larger.  This all begs the question:  why these films and why 
now? 
The End of Optimism: Apocalypse Film post 9/11 
When we sit down to watch Armageddon, Independence Day, or The 
Fifth Element, we already know that, come the eleventh hour, humanity will 
save itself.  Redemption is the point of these films:  the world must be saved 
so that in films to follow it can be blown up all over again.  In the current 
post-9/11 environment as seen onscreen it is the end of the world itself that 
is inevitable, so taken for granted that the cause has become almost 
irrelevant.  In Albert and Allen Hughes’s The Book of Eli (2010), we are 
merely told that “The war tore a hole in the sky.”  Is this a reference to 
nuclear explosion, to some futuristic weaponry, or to God’s judgment?  In 
John Hillcoat’s The Road, the issue of what caused the apocalypse is 
sidelined by the protagonists’ simple need to survive; we are left to make 
assumptions:  perhaps it was environmental, perhaps nuclear.  All we know 
is, “The clock stopped at 1:17.  There was a long shear of bright light, then a 
series of low concussions.”  In Alfonso Cuarón’s Children of Men (2006), 
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humans have inexplicably become infertile.  It is not that the causes of 
disaster in these films are insignificant or petty.  There is no doubt that the 
audience wants to know why apocalypse has happened.  But by not telling 
us, the films make a statement about our world today, about the inevitability 
of destruction and its source in a zone beyond our ability to question, 
comprehend, or strategize. 
On the whole, Post-9/11 apocalyptic fiction represents a movement 
away from the escapist images of destruction seen in the late 1990s.  While 
there are still a number of films which revel in over-the-top and brilliantly 
graphic set pieces of destruction--particularly Roland Emmerich’s The Day 
After Tomorrow and 2012 (2009) (he is a director who certainly seems to 
relish the prospect of disaster)—it remains the case that most post-9/11 
apocalypses are depicted in dark and thought-provoking films, bringing 
home the harsh realities of a world gone to hell and a planet slowly dying.  
The worst visions of destruction seen in such films as Independence Day 
were made concrete and witnessed on September 11th.  Post-9/11 films no 
longer need to offer speculation about the future, but instead purvey a 
realization of what is occurring in the here and now, perhaps implying that 
although we understand our eventual plight we are powerless to prevent it.  
There is something sublime in this very description; the idea that we are 
careening towards a dramatic and spectacular end; that the finale will be 
glorious, vast, universal in scope. Just as the images witnessed on our 
television screens on September 11, 2001 were sublime in themselves, they 
have re-configured the audience’s perception of scenes of destruction.  Post-
9/11 apocalyptic films have frequently traded in a different kind of sublime 
effect, moving away from the depiction of destruction itself and focusing 
instead on aftermaths, huge and unbounded expanses of devastation and 
waste, and the fate of the survivor. 
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Post-9/11 apocalypse films tend to be isolationist.  In the 1990s 
apocalyptic blockbusters’ scripts concentrated on the problem of working in 
teams.  Lead characters relied upon a network of partners, sidekicks, agents, 
assistants, and functionaries to help guide them to a solution that would 
save the planet.  Thus, in Independence Day we have the macho Captain 
Steven Hillier (Will Smith) bringing his brawn to the aid of traditional 
science boffin David Levinson (Jeff Goldblum).  Along the way we meet 
many side characters, most notably the American President (Bill Pullman) 
and a group of pilots who also have important roles to play in the eventual 
defeat of the alien invaders.  In Emmerich’s Godzilla there is a very similar 
set-up, the science boffin, Dr. Niko Tatopoulos (Matthew Broderick), 
needing the assistance of French secret service agent Philippe Roaché (Jean 
Réno).  Once again we have the interference of an authority figure, Mayor 
Ebert (Michael Lerner), as well as a romantic sub-plot, the American 
military, and the cameo comedy performance of ‘Animal’ (Hank Azaria).  In 
Michael Bay’s Armageddon, Bruce Willis’s Harry Stamper escorts a drilling 
team into space in an attempt to prevent an asteroid from hitting the Earth, 
an operation that is only possible with the help and support of NASA, and 
which would also have failed if it were not for the exploits of a crazy 
Russian astronaut, Lev Andropov (Peter Stormare).  Stephen Keane notices 
the importance of a team mentality within the film:   
Repeatedly throughout the film Stamper is referred to as a Red 
Adair, “the world’s best deep core driller,” but fundamentally 
his leadership principle is tempered with the value of 
teamwork:  “I’m only the best because I work with the best.”xi 
Lev’s portrayal of stereotypical Russian eccentricity is somewhat indicative 
of these films’ attitude towards notions of racial difference.  As played by a 
Swedish actor who moved to the U.S. in 1993, Lev’s role as the comic relief 
brushes over nearly half a century’s worth of Cold War history.  The 1990s 
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liberal sensibility, which also seems in these films to be dealt with 
reductively in the space of an hour and a half to two hour script, is all 
pervasive; as Lev himself pronounces, “Components. American 
components, Russian components. All made in Taiwan!” The message of 
these films is clear: by working together, any possible disaster can be 
averted, from erupting volcanoes and asteroids to giant lizards and alien 
invaders. 
When this is contrasted with contemporary post-apocalyptic films we 
tend to find a rather different approach in the latter.  Here our characters 
are lone survivors.  They are often hardened types:  men who have learnt 
how to survive in the harshest of worlds, men who take no prisoners and 
who stop for no one.  A particularly pure example can be seen in The Road, 
as much an apocalyptic drama as an action movie.  A man and his son 
(Viggo Mortensen, Kodi Smit-McPhee) wander through a post-apocalyptic 
wasteland, heading south to the coast in search of warmth and food.  In this 
place where hope does not exist and survival is everything, (but also, 
apparently, a fruitless endeavor), the pair struggle to keep sight of their 
humanity.  Father and son endure through extreme circumstances, 
constantly on the look out for groups of cannibals, their greatest fear.  That 
this is to be the darkest of films is established early on when the father 
shows his son how to shoot himself in case they are captured.  When the 
two finally reach the coast they find not salvation and respite, but as grey 
and dead a landscape as we have seen throughout the movie.  Despite the 
narrative strategy of the son being adopted by a family at the end of the 
film, after the father has died leaving him to fend for himself, this is without 
doubt a film harboring a deep pessimism towards the future. 
 The Road is filled with isolation.  While the father relies on the boy 
for survival—emotional, not physical--this is still a film in which they do not 
find a society to join.  When they do meet a character who does not want to 
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eat them, the father’s survival instincts tell him they should move on as 
quickly as possible, and so bonding with the other is foreclosed.  These 
principal figures are also isolated by the camera, long-shots of the pair 
framed against the hostile environment predominating.  These shots have 
become a staple of post-9/11 apocalyptic cinema and can be seen frequently 
in other films such as 28 Days Later, The Book of Eli, and I am Legend.  
Culture, sociability, relationship, bonding—all are broken away. 
I Am Legend begins with a scene in which Robert Neville (Will 
Smith) speeds through the streets of a totally evacuated Manhattan chasing 
deer.  There is a playful, fantasy element to the way he drives, with the shiny 
red sports car reflecting light and Neville skilfully using sidewalks as 
shortcuts.  This is his city, now.  He is free to break into houses, take DVDs 
from the rental store, hit golf balls at cars left abandoned.  His only 
companion is a dog whose primary function in the narrative appears to be to 
give Neville someone to talk to for the first half of the film.  When his dog 
dies after being bitten by one of the infected who, a strange cross between 
vampire and zombie, populate the city at night, he is for the moment left 
utterly alone.  Hardened and self-centered, the men in these films are not 
removed from emotion.  They cling to a shred of life without which they see 
no reason to be.  In The Road this talisman is the boy, in I Am Legend it is 
the dog.  Neville’s response is to attempt to commit suicide while taking as 
many of the infected with him.  Fortunately he is rescued by a woman and 
now, with companionship (if not also sexual availability) restored, he is able 
to carry on and eventually complete his quest to find a cure for the 
devastating infection. 
I Am Legend may have a hopeful ending, as Neville’s cure is taken to 
a survivor’s colony, but ultimately he has given his life to protect it.  This is 
a familiar ending for the contemporary post-apocalyptic film:  we have 
already seen that Mortensen’s character dies at the end of The Road, along 
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with the centrally important Eli (Denzel Washington) in The Book of Eli 
and the hero figure Theo Faron (Clive Owen) in Children of Men.  But if, as 
these films would suggest, the apocalypse is unstoppable, and if our heroes 
die for just a small glimmer of hope, what is it that is finally being offered?  
Why do we continue to watch them?  The fantasy elements we see in the 
story of the lone survivor do not seem escapist in the way that 1990s cinema 
sought escapism through the destruction of the “indestructible” (our 
buildings and way of life).  In the 1990s we knew that when a lead character 
actually died (Harry Stamper in Armageddon, or Arnold Schwarzenegger in 
End of Days [1999]), he died in order to save our world.  What, however, 
are we saving now through the sacrifice of the hero in the post-apocalyptic 
world? 
Conclusion: A Hungry and Literal End 
It is always important to reflect consciousness of context in any piece 
of work.  It can be all too easy, when focused so closely on one small area of 
culture, to overlook the bigger picture.  While I have labelled all of these 
films as post-9/11, this does not mean that they are a product of 9/11 
alone.  These films are of course products of the decade just passed since 
9/11, a decade that has seen the advent of new kinds of war and that has 
been plagued by financial collapse, economic and global strife, and concerns 
about the future sustainability of the planet and of our way of life.  While 
9/11 may be the defining moment in Western culture over the past decade, 
there is no doubting the influence of these other forms of social disaster. 
Gary Ross’s 2012 adaptation of Suzanne Collins’s novel The Hunger 
Games is a film which draws on many of these contemporary fears and 
issues.  In many ways an old fashioned dystopic text in the mold of 1984, 
The Hunger Games thrusts its audience into a world that has been vividly 
and clearly divided along class lines.  Ross creates a film charged with a 
visual style that plays to the idea of social division and expresses the 
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rich/poor dichotomy upon which the futuristic dystopia is—somehow 
unavoidably--founded.  The economic consciousness of the film reflects 
only one aspect of today’s concerns.  The film also deals with over-
indulgence, fascism, state propaganda, and the manipulation of the 
workforce primarily through fear and surveillance.  To this extent it is a 
classical dystopia, extrapolating current conditions in order to examine the 
problems of the present in the “safe” context of sci-fi futurism.  The ruler, 
President Snow (Donald Sutherland), is not shy about expressing the dark 
agenda which underlies the Hunger Games themselves, a brutal gladiatorial-
style conflict in which twenty-four young men and women, selected at 
random, compete in a battle to the death to win honor for their districts.  
Snow tells Seneca Crane (Wes Bentley), the impresario who runs the Games, 
“Hope . . . is the only thing stronger than fear.”  But, too, in Snow’s eyes “A 
lot of hope is dangerous.”  Certainly the higher authorities in this futuristic 
nation of Panem spare no opportunity for bloodshed in order to maintain 
the status quo that keeps the wealthy in power.  Their personal visual excess, 
emphasized through extreme style and garish make-up, marks them out as 
the vestiges of a decadent society destined for decline.   
What defines the post-9/11 apocalyptic film is a concern with the 
inevitability of destruction, and the presentation of a future in which all that 
we have left is faith.  In The Hunger Games it is the catchphrase of the elite, 
“May the odds be ever in your favor” that is perhaps most revealing.  Of 
course it is ironic, since in a nation like Panem, the odds are never in your 
favor if you are poor enough to need them to be.  Just as the working class 
are dominated and exploited, the odds of 24/1 for you to survive the games 
themselves are certainly not in the participants’ favor.  This and the other 
post-9/11 films discussed here are systematically characterized by a loss of 
belief in change.  Human agency has been lost.  In these bleak depictions of 
the future there is no room left for the utopian impulse, only the desperate 
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need to survive in a world that has been destroyed not by one specific threat 
as such, but by any one of a number of end-game scenarios.  These are 
certainly not films which celebrate the end rather their purpose appears to 
be to mourn the loss of the future.  Why do we watch them?  Perhaps in 
order to find something which lies outside the system of capital, circulating 
around the globe, touching every aspect of life.  Maybe because Jameson’s 
assertion, that it is easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of 
capitalism, is the resulting reality of a catastrophic loss of faith in change.  
Or maybe it is in order to remind ourselves of the bleakness of the future, 
like trying to pinch oneself in order to wake-up as if from a nightmare 
unfolding. 
Lars Von Trier’s late 2011 film Melancholia is an example of just how 
far the inevitability of destruction has come in post-9/11 film.  Melancholia 
is one of those rare examples of a film in which the world does actually end, 
and, as the filmmaker would have it, for good.  Given that the main 
protagonist, Justine (Kirsten Dunst), is battling against depression, there is 
certainly nothing light-hearted about this apocalypse, a cosmic one 
portrayed as the collision of the Earth with another planet (mirrored in a 
preparatory opening scene).  No science can prevent the world from ending, 
and it is entirely beyond the control of the characters.  This is a fact made 
overt through Justine’s brother-in-law John, played by Kiefer Sutherland – 
normally renowned for his almost omnipotent powers in fighting terrorist 
apocalypses in the popular TV show 24.  John is an astronomer, a man of 
science, convinced that the two planets will pass harmlessly by each other.  
By the end of the film it has become obvious that science will not win the 
day and that in fact the world will end.  John promptly commits suicide.   Is 
this the logical conclusion of the kind of end-of-worldism that has been 
prevalent over the last decade?  Writing in 2012, we have reached yet 
another end point with another predicted apocalypse upon us.  Fascinated as 
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we are by ends, perhaps in our current state it would be far better off to 
think about beginnings and re-imaginings than what is perhaps the easiest of 
ways out:  the end of all.  While post-9/11 apocalyptic films may often have 
more to say about society and the future of the planet than those 1990s 
Hollywood spectaculars, surely their message of hopelessness leaves no 
room for building a better future.  On some level, those crass and populist 
blockbusters at least sent the message that something could be done to 
change the world, that yes, humanity could save the planet.      
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